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THE REQUIREMENT OF PRIVITY
IN ENFORCING A WARRANTY
Welsh v. Redyard
167 Ohio St. 57, 146 N.E. 2d 299 (1957)
The plaintiff's husband bought an electric cooker from the de-
fendant, a retail dealer. The vendee's wife, the plaintiff, was using the
cooker in the manner in which such corokers are ordinarily used, when
it gave her an electric shock, exploded and injured her. The plaintiff
conceded that the action was not based on negligence. She founded her
action on a warranty of fitness for the use to which she had put it. The
court held there were not sufficient allegations to support a determination
that the husband had made a contract with the defendant for the benefit
of his wife or that he had acted as his wife's agent; hence the court did
not pass upon these issues.
The plaintiff's chief contention was that the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular use extended to her; that the defendant warranted
and held out to the general public, and more especially to the plaintiff,
that the article was fit for the use for which it was sold and to which
the plaintiff put it. The Ohio Supreme Court held that privity of con-
tract is necessary to recover on an implied warranty of fitness. Two
judges dissented without opinion.
Generally privity is said to be required for a recovery under an
implied warranty.' Most courts hold that a warranty is a contract and
there must be a contractual relationship, i.e. privity. Professor Williston
indicates that this is not a necessary conclusion since:
A warranty is in many cases imposed by law not in accordance
with the intention of the parties; and in its origin was enforced
in an action sounding in tort, based on the plaintiff's reliance
on deceitful appearances or representations, rather than on a
promise, and where forms of action are still differentiated, an
action of tort is generally allowed even at the present day.2
Inroads on the privity doctrine have been made, particularly in
sales of food.' These cases usually deal with an ultimate consumer
suing the manufacturer or processor and give a cause of action to the
purchaser where privity is dubious or not present at all. The courts have
used theories calling for the warranty to run with the chattel as in real
property transactions,4 or that the dealer is a mere go-between to establish
177 C.J.S., Sales, §305, p. 1123 (1952).
2 1 WILLISTON. Sales 649 (rev. ed. 1948).
3 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Smith, 97 S.W. 2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936);
Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., Inc., 192 App. Div. 186, 182 N.Y.S. 459 (1920);
Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920); Nemela v.
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4 Anderson v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.W. 48 (1937); VOLO, HANDBOOK
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
contacts for the manufacturer,5 or that the plaitiff is a third party
beneficiary, and intended to be such, by the defendant.6  These cases
demonstrate that the privity doctrine need not be so restrictive that it
forecloses cases where there obviously should be a legal right in the
plaintiff.
Is the agency theory to be the only protection for members of the
purchaser's family where the husband or father buys articles intended to
be used by his family in the manner for which sold? The results of
such a doctrine can be extremely bizarre. Under such a theory it is
probable that if the wife buys the food and her husband is injured, he
has a cause of action as her principal.' But in the majority of cases the
husband provides the means of support and so when he buys the food,
he is a principal and an injured wife or child under this concept, cannot
recover under an implied warranty."
These strange results might be justified if warranty were strictly
a contract action, but its origin is in tort.9 It is an expression of the law's
movement away from cavzeat emptor, an outmoded principle in our
machine-age economy.' 0
When viewed in this light, an extension of the privity doctrine to
include persons in the purchaser's family or guests who might be injured
by the article used in the warranted fashion seems logical. The new
Uniform Commercial Code, enacted to date in -Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts, proposes the idea by statute:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer
or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that
such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach of this warranty. A seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.1
Some Ohio lower courts have shown the way to accomplish this
purpose judicially. In Tennebaum v. Pendergast the plaintiff's husband
bought a bottle of a carbonated beverage and gave it to the plaintiff. It
exploded while in her possession and she was injured. The court held
that within the terms of the statute "buyer" means a person who buys
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L. REv. 431 (1955).
8 A number of jurisdictions make an exception to the privity requirement in
food cases, but the majority probably still require privity. See 77 C.J.S., Sales,
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or any legal successor of such person and so the Ohio statute12 en-
compasses the wife. Conceding that it might be argued that the wife
was not a successor in interest, yet the transfer was at least a gift by
implication and as such would be within the contemplation of the parties
at the time.'
3
DiVello v. Gardner Machine Co.'4 extended the doctrine to include
an employee injured by a grinding wheel which was purchased by his
employer from the defendant. The court quoted from Mannz v.
MacWhyte:'5 "The requirement of privity between the injured party
and the manufacturer of the article which has injured him has been
obliterated from Pennsylvania law."'"
The trend is towards bringing warranty actions more within the
reasonable framework of the protective policy of the law to the buyer
who must place'trust in his vendor in this day of complicated, nationally
advertised, commercial products. The courts can do this by including
at least the family within the meaning of "buyer" in section 1315.01
of the Ohio Revised Code.
The need is imperative because a negligence action, available under
the doctrine of MacPherson v. Buick, 7 is many times worthless because
of the practical difficulty of meeting the burden of proving negligence
since the article passes through so many hands.
Inclusion of the family and guests of the vendee within the seller's
implied warranty of fitness, where the article is used in the accustomed
manner and causes personal injury, seems to be the logical step in placing
the loss where it belongs.
Richard V. Patchen
12 OHio REV. CODE, §1315.01 (B): "Buyer" means a person who buys or agrees
to buy goods, or any legal successor in interest of such person."
13 55 Ohio L. Abs. 231 (C.P. Franklin Co. 1948).
14 65 Ohio L. Abs. 58, 102 N.E. 2d, 289, (C.P. Cuyahoga Co. 1951). This case
was cited by Justice Jackson in his dissent in the Texas City Case, Dalelute v.
U.S. 346 U.S. 15, 52 (1953).
15 155 F. 2d 449 (3rd Cir. 1948).
16The Pennsylvania law before the Uniform Commercial code was adopted
in 1953, was at least tending toward stripping the need for privity in personal
injury actions. The Mannz case contends privity was completely removed in
personal injury actions. This same view is noted in Hunter-Wilson Distilling v.
Foust Distilling Co., 84 F. Supp. 996 (DC.M.D. Pa. 1949). The general require-
ment for privity exists except where there is personal injury, but the Pennsylvania
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Uniform Commercial Code. See 12A PURDON'S PENNA. STAT. ANN. 199 (1954).
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direction of movement was with the Dilello view.
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